Reform for sale : a common agency model with moral hazard frictions / Perrin Lefebvre, David Martimort
Material type:
TextSeries: Publisher: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2023Description: 78p, nilISBN: 9781009285605; 9781009285582Subject(s): Lobbying | Pressure groups | Policy sciencesDDC classification: 324.4 Online resources: Click here to access online | Click here to access online Summary: This Element focuses on the efforts of interest groups who try to to influence a policy-maker who in turn exerts effort to increase the probability that a reform be implemented. It analyses linking of the allocative efficiency and redistribution of the aggregate surplus, as both depend on the set of active principals as well as on the group size
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Gabriel Afolabi Ojo Central Library (Headquarters). | K3840. A44 2023 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 0187750 | |
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Gabriel Afolabi Ojo Central Library (Headquarters). | K3840. A44 2023 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 0187751 | |
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Books
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Gabriel Afolabi Ojo Central Library (Headquarters). | K3840. A44 2023 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 0187752 |
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This Element focuses on the efforts of interest groups who try to to influence a policy-maker who in turn exerts effort to increase the probability that a reform be implemented. It analyses linking of the allocative efficiency and redistribution of the aggregate surplus, as both depend on the set of active principals as well as on the group size
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