Reform for sale : a common agency model with moral hazard frictions / Perrin Lefebvre, David Martimort
Material type:
TextSeries: Publisher: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2023Description: 1 online resource (78 pages) illustrationsISBN: 9781009285605Subject(s): Lobbying | Pressure groups | Policy sciencesDDC classification: KLO30 .L44, 24.4 Online resources: Click here to access online | Click here to access online Summary: This Element focuses on the efforts of interest groups who try to to influence a policy-maker who in turn exerts effort to increase the probability that a reform be implemented. It analyses linking of the allocative efficiency and redistribution of the aggregate surplus, as both depend on the set of active principals as well as on the group size
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Gabriel Afolabi Ojo Central Library (Headquarters). | KL030 .L44 2022 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 0195238 | |
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Gabriel Afolabi Ojo Central Library (Headquarters). | KL030 .L44 2022 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 0195239 |
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| KJE6530 .L66 2022 Causation in competition law damages actions / | KJE6530 .L66 2022 Causation in competition law damages actions / | KL97.4.P74 2013 The Legal 500 | KL030 .L44 2022 Reform for sale : a common agency model with moral hazard frictions / | KL030 .L44 2022 Reform for sale : a common agency model with moral hazard frictions / | KLB1155 .U33 2021 2006 Physics Education Research Conference : Syracuse, New York, 26-27 July 2006 / | KLB1155 .U33 2021 2006 Physics Education Research Conference : Syracuse, New York, 26-27 July 2006 / |
This Element focuses on the efforts of interest groups who try to to influence a policy-maker who in turn exerts effort to increase the probability that a reform be implemented. It analyses linking of the allocative efficiency and redistribution of the aggregate surplus, as both depend on the set of active principals as well as on the group size
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