000			01728nam a2200193 i 4500
020			_a9781009108386
082	0	4	_b3
100	1		_aZhang, Youlang,
245	1	0	_aWhen governments lobby governments _bThe institutional origins of intergovernmental persuasion in America _cYoulang Zhang
264		1	_aCambridge _bCambridge University Press _c2022
300			_a84 pages
490	1		_aCambridge elements. Elements in public and nonprofit administration,
500			_aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system
520			_aWhy are some subnational governments more likely to lobby the national government than others? Extant research in social sciences has widely discussed lobbying dynamics in the private sector. However, governments lobby governments, too. In the United States, lobbying is a popular strategy for state and local governments to obtain resources from and influence policies in the federal government. Nevertheless, extant research offers limited theoretical analysis or empirical evidence on this phenomenon. This Element provides a comprehensive study of intergovernmental lobbying activities in the United States and, in particular, an institutional analysis of the lobbying decisions of state and local governments. The study findings contribute to public administration, public policy, and political science literature by offering theoretical and empirical insights into the institutional factors that might influence subnational policymaking, fiscal resource management, intergovernmental relations, and democratic representation
650		0	_aLobbying
650		0	_aFederal government
856	4	0	_uhttp://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/9781009104180/type/ELEMENT
942			_2lcc _cBK
999			_c10287 _d10287