| 000 | 01212nam a2200217 i 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 020 | _a9781009285605 | ||
| 082 | 0 | 4 |
_aKLO30 .L44, 24.4 _b2 |
| 100 | 1 | _aLefebvre, Perrin, | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aReform for sale : _ba common agency model with moral hazard frictions / _cPerrin Lefebvre, David Martimort |
| 264 | 1 |
_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _c2023 |
|
| 300 |
_a1 online resource (78 pages) _billustrations:, |
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| 490 | 1 | _aCambridge elements. Elements in law, economics and politics | |
| 520 | 8 | _aThis Element focuses on the efforts of interest groups who try to to influence a policy-maker who in turn exerts effort to increase the probability that a reform be implemented. It analyses linking of the allocative efficiency and redistribution of the aggregate surplus, as both depend on the set of active principals as well as on the group size | |
| 650 | 0 | _aLobbying | |
| 650 | 0 | _aPressure groups | |
| 650 | 0 | _aPolicy sciences | |
| 700 | 1 | _aMartimort, David, | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttps://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/9781009285605/type/ELEMENT |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttps://go.ohiolink.edu/goto?url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/9781009285605/type/ELEMENT |
| 942 |
_2lcc _cBK |
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| 999 |
_c13916 _d13916 |
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